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A large portion of the work of moral philosopher R. M. Hare 
presents his attempt to ground normative ethics on mctaethics— 
the logic of moral reasoning and the meanings of the moral words. 
According to Hare's metaethical analysis, moral judgments are to 
be understood in terms of universal prescriptivism, which yields 
an act utilitarian account of morality at the normative level. While 
I find many attractive features in Hare's account of normative 
ethics, I believe Hare fails to demonstrate that the logical analysis 
of the moral concepts entails the normative theory he defends. 
The act utilitarian principle of morality is at best merely one 
possible principle that derives support from or is consistent with a 
Harean account of metaethics. As it stands, Hare's metaethical 
analysis is incapable of grounding any specific normative theory 
on its own. 
According to Hare's account of moral philosophy, the first steps 
in confronting and resolving moral issues call for an understanding 
of the meanings of the moral words and the logical properties that 
govern rational thought about moral questions.1 Hare emphasizes 
that "we come into moral philosophy asking certain moral 
questions, and the questions are posed in terms of certain concepts. 
If we go on trying to answer those questions, we are stuck with 
those concepts." 2 Thus Hare focuses on concepts such as ought 
and wrong, concepts that people actually use in the moral questions 
they ask. He maintains that understanding the meanings of such 
terms will yield certain logical properties, which in turn will 
determine the answers offered to these questions at the normative 
level. Since my concern focuses on Hare's move from the 
metaethical to the normative, it is crucial to examine the logical 
properties that give rise to our normative conclusions on Hare's 
account. 
Hare introduces three logical properties of moral judgments: 
universalizability, prescriptivity, and overridingness. According to 
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Hare, these three features of moral judgments restrict the manner 
in which we can think rationally about issues of morality. 
Furthermore, the properties of universalizability and prescriptivity 
taken together will ultimately determine the normative principles 
we use to guide our actions, specifically, act utilitarianism on Hare's 
account. I currently remain neutral on the merits of Hare's analysis 
of the moral words to yield these three properties. For purposes of 
argument in this paper, I am willing to accept his use of these 
properties. However, I will argue that even if Hare's tripartite 
analysis of moral language is correct, Hare is mistaken in his 
conclus ion that the propert ies of universa l izabi l i ty and 
prescr ipt ivi ty taken together yield the equivalent of act 
utilitarianism at the level of normative ethics. In order for my 
argument to proceed, it is necessary to consider each of the logical 
properties of moral judgments that Hare sets forth along with the 
practical implications that follow from them. I will first turn to 
universalizability. 
In Moral Thinking, Hare describes the universalizability of 
moral judgments in the following manner. 
Universalizability can be explained in various equivalent ways; 
it comes to this, that if we make different moral judgements 
about situations which we admit to be identical in their universal 
descriptive properties, we contradict ourselves. By 'different', 
I mean 'such that, if they were made about the same situation, 
they would be inconsistent with one another'.3 
He spells out this condition in his earlier book Freedom and Reason. 
Hare claims, "If a person says 'I ought to act in a certain way, but 
nobody else ought to act in that way in relevantly similar 
circumstances', then on my thesis he is abusing the word 'ought'; 
he is implicitly contradicting himself."4 Thus, the universalizability 
property of moral judgments places certain restrictions on our use 
of moral language and the types of judgments we can make about 
like cases. Essentially, the universalizability requirement calls for 
us to treat like cases alike, upon pain of contradiction. 
Hare is careful to emphasize that universalizability is not the 
same as generality.5 He claims, "Briefly, generality is the opposite 
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of specificity, whereas universalizability is compatible with 
specificity, and means merely the logical property of being 
governed by a universal quantifier and not containing individual 
constants." 6 Hare offers an example to illustrate his point. He says, 
"The two principles 'Never kill people' and 'Never kill people 
except in self-defense or in cases of adultery or judicial execution' 
are both equally universal, but the first is more general (less 
specific) than the second." 7 This reiterates Hare's earlier point that 
the notion of universalizability involves treating all relevantly 
similar cases the same regardless of how general or specific our 
moral judgments may be. This point is drilled home once again 
when Hare writes, "Moral judgements are, I claim, universalizable 
in only one sense, namely that they entail identical judgements 
about all cases identical in their universal properties." 8 We shall 
soon see that this, according to Hare, will have certain implications 
for the moral judgments we can rationally make, when combined 
with the prescriptive element of moral judgments. First, it is 
necessary to consider what the property of prescriptivity itself 
entails. 
According to Hare, "The prescriptivity of moral judgements 
can be explained formally as the property of entailing at least one 
imperative." 9 However, Hare believes that offering an account of 
prescriptivity in terms of imperatives will be too difficult. Thus, 
he explains prescriptivity in the following manner. "We say 
something is prescriptive if and only if, for some act A, some 
situation S, and some person P, if P were to assent (orally) to what 
we say, and not, in S, do A, he logically must be assenting 
insincerely." 1 0 Hare offers the following example for clarification: 
The mere fact that what we say could be given as a reason for 
acting in some way does not make it prescriptive. That the hotel 
faces the sea could be given as a reason for taking a room there, 
but to say that it does is not to say something prescriptive; for 
somebody who did not like looking at the sea could sincerely 
assent, and yet not take a room there. On the other hand if we 
say that it is a better hotel than the one on the other side of the 
road, there is a sense of'better than' (the prescriptive sense) in 
which a person who assented orally to our judgement, yet when 
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faced with a choice between the two hotels (other things such 
as price being equal), chose the other hotel, must have been 
saying something he did not really think. For if, in assenting, he 
assented sincerely to something prescriptive, he must think it 
better, and thus prefer it, and thus in the appropriate and other 
things being equal, choose it. The example could easily be 
adapted to make a similar point about the prescriptivity, in certain 
uses of'right', 'ought', and (a fortiori) 'must'." 
The significant element of Hare's example shows that when one 
offers a prescription, he or she is making some kind of evaluation 
or stating a preference from something. The significance of this 
point becomes apparent when we examine the logical properties 
of universalizability and prescriptivity taken together. 
Thus far we have examined two logical properties of moral 
j udgmen t s , universal izabi l i ty and prescr ipt ivi ty . The 
universalizability requirement calls for those of us making moral 
judgments to treat relevantly similar cases in the same ways. The 
prescriptivity requirement calls for us to recognize that moral 
judgments state preferences of those making the moral judgments. 
When we bring these two components together, we will find that 
in making moral judgments there is a requirement to universalize 
our prescriptions. According to Hare we will find "that the 
requirement to universalize or prescriptions , which is itself is a 
logical requirement if we are reasoning morally, demands that we 
treat other people s prescriptions (i. e. their desires, likings, and, 
in general preferences) as if they were our own." 1 2 This feature of 
moral judgments derived from the logical properties will serve as 
the basis of Hare's account of normative ethics. Prior to examining 
Hare's move from metaethics to normative ethics, we should briefly 
mention the final logical property of moral words according to 
Hare's metaethical analysis, overridingness. 
For our puiposes, it is significant to have some notion of what 
Hare means by overridingness merely to clarify that overridingness 
plays no role in his attempt to establish act utilitarianism from 
metaethical analysis. On Hare's account, overridingness serves to 
distinguish moral judgments from other evaluative judgments. He 
writes, "To treat a principle as overriding, then, is to let it always 
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override other principles when the conflict with it, and in the same 
way, let it override all other prescriptions, including non-
universalizable ones (e.g. plain desires)." 1 3 During this discussion, 
Hare notes that while overridingness is an important property of a 
moral judgment for purposes of distinction, it does not play a role 
in his argument that the logical properties of the moral words yield 
an act utilitarian account of normative ethics. This argument is 
left to the other properties of the moral words, universalizability 
and prescriptivity.1 4 
It is Hare's contention that the formal logical properties of the 
moral words, universalizability and prescriptivity, yield a system 
of moral reasoning identical with act utilitarianism.1 5 It is important 
to note that on Hare's account utilitarianism is composed of two 
elements , a formal element, which Hare describes as "a 
reformulation of the requirement that moral principles be properly 
universal" and a substantial element that the determination of what 
we ought to do requires the consideration of the preferences of all 
those who will be affected by our actions, a factor that corresponds 
to Hare's account of prescriptivity.1 6 Given these two elements, it 
is not surprising that Hare argues that utilitarianism follows from 
the logical properties of the moral words that he has introduced in 
his metaethical analysis. Thus, let us consider his argument. 
Hare maintains that: 
We shall see that the method of critical thinking which is imposed 
on us by the logical properties of the moral concepts requires 
us to pay attention to the satisfaction of the preferences of people 
(because moral judgements are prescriptive, and to have a 
preference is to accept a prescription); and to pay attention 
equally to the equal preferences of all those affected (because 
moral judgments have to be universal and therefore cannot pick 
out individuals).17 
It is when we apply this model of moral thinking to actual cases to 
determine what ought to be done in given circumstances that we 
see how the requirement to universalize our prescriptions generates 
utilitarianism on Hare's account. Before turning to one of Hare's 
practical examples to see how universal prescriptivism leads to 
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act utilitarianism, let us consider the requirements that the logical 
properties set forth in connection with act utilitarianism. 
First, Hare maintains that the prescriptivity element of moral 
judgments requires us to consider the preferences of those who 
might be affected by our actions. Second, as Hare states, "It follows 
from universalizability that if I now say that I ought to do a certain 
thing to a certain person, I am committed to the view that the very 
same thing ought to be done to me, were I in exactly his situation, 
including having the same personal characteristics and in particular 
the same motivational states." 1 8 But, as Hare points out, if I were 
in his shoes, it is likely that my motivational state would be different 
than the motivational state I have in my own position. Thus, if I 
am to consider his preferences as well as my own, as universal 
prcscripti vism requires, conflict between the two sets of preferences 
will follow.IM Thus, wc must determine how to resolve the conflict 
between the two sets of preferences while at the same time 
preserving the logical character of the moral concepts as universal 
and prescriptive. 
At this point, if we turn to Hare's example, we shall see not 
only the conflict resolution, but also Hare's account of how 
universal prescriptivism generates act utilitarianism. Consider the 
following scenario. Hare is in a situation where in order to park 
his car; he must move someone else's bicycle. Yet, the other person 
has some aversion to his bicycle being moved. 2 0 Hare claims that 
we can resolve this case in the same manner that we resolve 
conflicts between our own preferences. In such cases, we consider 
all of the preferences equally and the strongest overall preference 
wins out. When applied to the car versus bicycle case, Hare offers 
the following account: 
The other party wants me not to move his bicycle, but I want 
more to move it in order to park my car. I am fully aware of the 
strength of his desire, and therefore have a desire of equal 
strength that were I in his situation, the bicycle should stay where 
it is. But I also have my original desire to move it in order to 
park my car. This latter desire wins by superior strength. On the 
other hand, if the positions were reversed (the bicycle mine, the 
car his), and I could somehow prevent the bicycle being moved, 
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the case would be from my individual point of view different 
(though it is not different in its universal properties). Suppose 
that, in this different case, my desire not to have the bicycle 
moved is far weaker than the other party's desire to park his 
car; and suppose I am fully aware of the strength of his desire 
and therefore have an equal desire that, were I in his position I 
should be able to park my car. I shall then, in this different 
situation have again two desires: the original desire to leave my 
bicycle where it is, and my acquired desire that were I the other 
party I should be able to park my car; and the latter will be the 
stronger. So in this different situation I shall think that the bicycle 
ought to be moved.21 
What is seen in Hare's example is the role of both the prescriptivity 
and universalizability of the judgment (both Hare's preferences 
and the other's preferences are considered with the strongest 
preference determining the action that ought to be done). On Hare's 
account, "We see here in miniature how the requirement to 
universalize our prescriptions generates utilitarianism." 2 2 If we 
impartially compare the strengths of preferences between Hare 
and the owner of the bicycle with the strongest preferences winning 
out our conclusion is the same as that of act utilitarianism. Each 
system weighs the different sets of preferences against one another 
and the strongest overall preferences determine the right action in 
a given situation. Thus, when we combine the requirements of the 
two logical properties of moral judgments, universalizability and 
prescriptivity, we are committed to an act utilitarian account of 
normative ethics. 
Now that we have examined the logical properties of the moral 
words and Hare's move from these properties to the principle of 
act utilitarianism at the normative level, we can examine the success 
of Hare's argument and his use of metaethics as the foundation of 
his normative theory. It is my contention that Hare's metaethical 
analysis as it stands fails to ground act utilitarianism or any other 
single normative theory. 2 3 Rather it opens the door to a number of 
competing theories that may be established by adding additional 
premises to the metaethical analysis offered by Hare. In fact, by 
examining Hare's own account of the logic of the moral words 
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and the examples he considers, it is clear that his metaethics fails 
to ground the act utilitarian conclusions he advocates. 
As we have seen so far, Hare maintains that the meanings of 
the moral words give rise to the logical proper t ies of 
universalizability and prescriptivity, which in turn govern the kind 
of moral judgments we may rationally make. Universalizability 
requires that we assess cases that are alike in their universal 
properties in the same way. Prescriptivity brings the expression of 
preferences into moral judgments. When we combine these two 
features on Hare's account, there is a logical requirement to 
consider everyone's preferences. For purposes of argument, I am 
perfectly willing to grant Hare's premises as they are presented 
above. However, Hare goes on to argue that these assumptions are 
sufficient to establish an act utilitarian account of normative ethics; 
it is this conclusion that I wish to reject. 
In order for us to derive act utilitarianism out of Hare's account, 
it must be the case that we consider everyone's preferences equally 
and impartially with no one's preferences counting for any more 
than anyone else's preferences. It is clear that Hare believes this 
consideration to be captured by his account of metaethics. Recall 
a passage from Hare that I cited earlier that claims: 
.. .the method of critical thinking which is imposed on us by the 
logical properties of the moral concepts requires us to pay 
attention to the satisfaction of the preferences of people (because 
moral judgements are prescriptive, and to have a preference is 
to accept a prescription); and to pay attention equally to the 
equal preferences of all of those affected (because moral 
principles have to be universal and therefore cannot pick out 
individuals).24 
In this passage, we see clearly Hare's belief that the equal 
consideration of everyone's preferences follows from the 
universalizability of the prescription. This is also evident in Hare's 
example comparing his own preferences with those of the bicycle 
owner. In that case, neither the interests of Hare, nor those of the 
bicycle owner were given any special weight or priority; both 
parties' interests were considered equally and impartially. Hare 
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becomes more explicit about the equal consideration of everyone's 
preferences in Moral Thinking when he claims: 
In estimating the preferences of others, and my future 
preferences, I have, then, to keep my own antecedent present 
preferences out of the reckoning. This does not mean that my 
own preferences play no part in moral thinking. The argument 
of ch. 6 required us to be impartial between our own and other 
people's preferences, not altruistic in its correct sense of giving 
more weight to the preferences of others. We have to treat 
everybody as one, including ourselves: to do so unto others as 
we wish they should do unto us (sc. in their situations with their 
preferences), and love our neighbors as (not more than) 
ourselves. We get no extra weight for our own preferences 
because we are doing the moral thinking, but they get equal 
weight with those of others in so far as we are affected parties.25 
It once again becomes obvious that in Hare's estimation, universal 
prescriptivism requires the equal consideration of everyone's 
preferences and thus yields a utilitarian account of normative ethics, 
for uti l i tarianism assesses morality in terms of the equal 
consideration of everyone's preferences. 
The difficulty arises when we raise the issue of where the notion 
of equal consideration comes into Hare's theory. As the element 
of prescriptivity merely brings in the notion that the expression of 
preferences is an element of moral judgment, it is up to the notion 
of universalizability to bring in the idea of equal consideration. 
From the passages just mentioned, it seems clear that Hare sees 
the notion of equal consideration as originating from the 
universalizability requirement. This is explicit when we consider 
a passage from Freedom and Reason where Hare maintains that 
the utilitarian principle, 'Everybody to count for one, nobody for 
more than o n e ' can be just i f ied by the demand for 
universalizability.2 6 He argues: 
For what this principle means is that everyone is entitled to 
equal consideration, and that if it is said that two people ought 
to be treated differently, some difference must be cited as the 
grounds for these different moral judgements. And this is a 
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corollary of the requirement of universalizability. It must be 
emphasized that it, like the principle of universalizability itself, 
is a purely formal principle, following from the logical character 
of the moral words; no substantial moral judgements follow 
from it unless the substance is put in by arguments such as we 
have suggested%and these require other ingredients besides 
logic, as we have seen (6.3,4). The substance of moral 
judgements of a utilitarian comes from a consideration of the 
substantial inclinations and interests that people actually have, 
together with the formal requirement that the prescriptions which 
they prompt have to be universal izable before moral judgements 
can be made out of them.27 
This passage emphasizes Hare's belief that the element of equal 
consideration is entailed by the property of universalizability. Thus 
when we combine this with prescriptivity on his account it may be 
seen that the logic of the moral words calls for us to consider 
everyone's preferences equally%an ingredient I earlier claimed 
was essential in Hare's attempt to ground utilitarianism on his 
system of metaethics. If Hare were correct in his claim that 
universalizability entails equal consideration then the difficulty 
would be avoided. However , this unders tanding of 
universalizability offers a much richer account than Hare has set 
forth or seems to commit to. 
At this point, it is important to note that Hare himself argues, 
"Moral judgements are, I claim, universalizable in only one sense, 
namely that they entail identical judgements about all cases 
identical in their universal properties." 2 8 This characterization of 
the universalizability requirement makes no mention of the element 
of equal consideration nor does such an element seem to be entailed 
by this account. All this characterization of universalizability 
implies is that if we consider people's interests equally in one case 
to determine the morally appropriate action then we must consider 
people's interests equally in all relevantly similar cases. If a case 
is such that there is a relevant difference from the first, it may well 
be that we are not required to consider everyone's preferences 
equally. If there are grounds for giving more weight to one person's 
preferences than another's such consideration is permitted by the 
universalizability requirement as long as this case is different in 
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its universal properties from the first case. All universalizability 
requires is that like cases are treated alike; if there are relevant 
differences between the cases there may well be differences in the 
way they are treated. Furthermore, universalizability makes no 
claims about treating everyone's preferences equally to begin with. 
We can offer moral judgments that weigh one party's interests 
more than another's interests as long as we do the same in all 
relevantly similar cases as all universalizability requires is that we 
treat like cases alike. 
That Hare is commit ted to this weaker not ion of 
universalizability is evident in his discussion of the fanatic Nazi 
who offers prescriptions that Hare characterizes as universal but 
clearly fail to employ the element of equal consideration Hare wants 
to believe follows from universalizability. The fanatic Nazi desires 
that Jews be exterminated despite the obvious and perhaps even 
stronger desire of the Jew not to be exterminated. Furthermore, 
the extreme fanatic Nazi, however rare they may be in actuality, is 
in theory unwilling to let go of his convictions and thus perfectly 
willing to grant that even if he were to occupy the reversed role, 
that of the Jew, that he too ought to be exterminated even though as a 
Jew he would surely have a very strong competing desire. According 
to Hare, the fanatic Nazi offers a universal prescription. He writes: 
The important thing for our present argument is that, in this 
wider sense, the Nazi is desiring that the Jews should be 
exterminated; and, because the desire is a universal one 
corresponding to an ideal, he desires that anyone having the 
characteristics which make him want to exterminate Jews should 
likewise be exterminated. And from this it follows that, if he is 
sincere and clear-headed, he desires that he himself should be 
exterminated if he were to come to have the characteristics of Jews.29 
While Hare holds that the fanatic Nazi does make a universal 
prescription, he argues that a truly intractable Nazi, one who will 
admit that he too should be exterminated if it turns out he is a Jew, 
is extremely rare. 3 0 However, for our purposes the rarity of such 
people is irrelevant. All that matters to our point of concern is 
Hare 's admission that the fanatic Nazi offers a universal 
prescription that Jews be exterminated regardless of the preferences 
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of the Jew. It is clear from this claim, that the Nazi does not afford 
the preferences of the Jew as much weight as his own preferences. 
It is clear that the prescription of the fanatic Nazi while universal 
on Hare's own admission fails to include the element of equal 
consideration that Hare claims follows from the property of 
universalizability. Thus, Hare's discussion of the fanatic Nazi lends 
further support to the notion that universalizability does not entail 
equal consideration on Hare's own account of universalizability. 
Without the claim that everyone's preferences must be considered 
equally and impartially, Hare's metaethics is unable to generate 
an act utilitarian account of normative ethics. 
There is however, one other move we might consider before 
rejecting Hare's conclusion completely. If we recall Hare's account 
of the logical properties of moral judgments as set out at the 
beginning of this paper, we should remember that universalizability 
and prescriptivity did not exhaust Hare's list. There was an 
additional property, overridingness, that Hare introduced. Thus, 
we must consider the possibility that the overridingness of moral 
judgments can account for the element of equal consideration, 
allowing Hare to derive act utilitarianism from his metaethical 
analysis after all. Nonetheless, if we turn back to our earlier 
discussion of overridingness (p. 6), we will find that Hare himself 
admits that this property does not play a role in providing a 
foundation for his normative theory.3 1 Furthermore, if reflect back 
on Hare's account of overridingness we will find that, "To treat a 
principle as overriding, then, is to let it always override other 
principles when they conflict with it, and in the same way, let it 
override all other prescriptions, including non-universalizable ones 
(e.g. plain desires)." 3 2 Given this, we will find that it is unlikely 
that the logical property of overridingness is able to account for 
the impartiality and equal consideration of preferences that are 
necessary for Harean metaethics to generate utilitarianism. 
Without the element of equal consideration, all that is required 
by the logic of the moral words as seen in Hare's account of 
metaethics is that in making moral judgments we consult the 
preferences of those affected by an action and treat like cases alike. 
These restrictions do not yield act utilitarianism on their own. Other 
normative views meet these requirements as well. Hare himself 
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admits that the fanatic Nazi is able to meet these conditions. 
Another possibility is the Rawlsian principle of maximin, which 
also requires the consideration of everyone's preferences. On this 
account, however, contrary to that of utilitarianism, not everyone's 
preferences are to count equally; rather, we arc required to give 
priority to the preferences of the worst off. If all that is required by 
the logical properties of the moral words is that the preferences of 
all are considered and like cases are treated alike, the principle of 
maximin is not excluded by Harean metaethics. Furthermore, any 
other normat ive theory that meets the condi t ions of 
universalizability, prescriptivity, and overridingness also finds as much 
support in Hare's account of metaethics as act utilitarianism does. 
R. M. Hare devotes a significant portion of his work to his 
attempt to demonstrate the existence of a metaethical foundation 
for an act utilitarian account of normative ethics. Specifically, Hare 
points to the logical properties of universal izabi l i ty and 
prescriptivity as entailing the consideration of everyone's 
preferences in an equal and impartial manner and thus giving rise 
to an act utilitarian account of normative ethics. Despite all of his 
efforts, all Hare actually shows is that the universalizability and 
prescriptivity of moral judgments require that we consider the 
interests of everyone. Hare's account of these two features leaves 
out the further notion of equality and impartiality that he reads 
into them. Consequently, Hare fails to establish a foundation for 
the principle of utility in his account of metaethics. At best, Hare 
offers an account of metaethics that could with additional premises 
ground any of a variety of moral principles. A reevaluation of 
Harean metaethics and the search for such additional premises in 
the logic of the moral words along with an exploration of the 
normative implications that might result from a revised version of 
Harean metaethics opens the door to new lines of inquiry for the 
moral philosopher. 
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